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Introduction 
The term ‘New Right’ refers to a strand of Conservative politics emerging in the UK 
during the 1970s, and flourishing mainly under Margaret Thatcher (Beech 2016: 23). 
The Conservative Party continued to dominate British politics until 1997, when a period 
of 13 years of Labour governments, from 1997 until 2010, would follow, with Tony Blair 
pursuing an arguably rather EU-friendly course. When the Conservatives came back to 
government in a coalition in 2010 and subsequently won the 2015 general election, 
however, Prime Minister David Cameron tried to renegotiate the relationship with the 
EU before implementing the election promise to hold a referendum, which resulted in 
the pro-Brexit vote last June and Cameron’s resignation. Cameron’s successor, Theresa 
May, formally notified the EU of the UK’s intention to leave on 29 March 2017, while the 
ultimate consequences of last year’s referendum result – though still uncertain to say the 
least – are gradually taking shape. The question arises how this could have happened 
and why these developments seem to have taken many politicians, analysts, scholars 
and other observers by surprise. 
 
Research Design 
While the Conservative party was in government, it was comparatively easy to see 
where their priorities lay – but their time in opposition constitutes a veritable ‘black-
box’ in terms of research on the evolving discourse. This paper will argue that to 
understand whether the Brexit referendum really came out of the blue or indeed has 
been a long time coming, it is necessary to explore how the Conservative party’s 
discourse has developed during their time in opposition. This paper thus sets out to 
investigate how the Conservative discourse on Europe has developed during the 13 
years of opposition, hoping to generate a better understanding of Conservative positions 
and policies today. The current challenges epitomised by the growing popularity of ‘New 
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Right’ thinking must be traced back in time to unearth their origin and to help explain 
their growing popularity. 
 Underlying my research design is the theoretical assumption that “[d]iscourse 
consists of coherent chains of propositions which establish a ‘discourse world’, or 
‘discourse ontology’ – in effect, the ‘reality’ that is entertained by the speaker” (Chilton 
2004: 54). This entertained reality is linked to questions of power in Foucault’s thinking: 
Storey summarises that according to Foucault, “[d]iscourses produce knowledge and 
knowledge is always a weapon of power” (2015: 135). In the words of the original: “It is 
in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together” (Foucault 2009: 318).  
 Clarifying the properties of power, Foucault rejects the notion that it always 
suppresses, but suggests that it can also be productive: “In fact, power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (1979: 194). In 
addition to this point, Foucault explains that whole ‘regimes of truth’ govern discourses, 
i.e. they determine what is believed and what is rejected. Foucault insists that “[e]ach 
society has its own regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth – that is, the types of 
discourse it accepts and makes function as true” (2002a: 131). He thus advocates 
research into “how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth” 
(Foucault 2002b: 230). While Foucault’s thinking does not deny that anything exists non-
discursively, he postulates that the way it is ‘constituted’, i.e. how it is interpreted, and 
whether it is accepted or rejected, has an influence on politics. Storey clarifies that 
“[w]hat Foucault calls ‘regimes of truth’ do not have to be ‘true’; they have only to be 
thought of as ‘true’ and acted on as if ‘true’.” (2015: 135). Fairclough concurs in that, 
especially in political discourse, “how the context of action is represented […] affects 
which course of action is proposed, which explains the intense competition and conflict 
over winning acceptance or imposing one account” (Fairclough/Fairclough 2012: 7). 
 The research questions I thus set out to answer are: When did Conservative party 
leaders first mention a referendum on EU policy? How is the line of argumentation in 
favour of a referendum justified? Which ‘discourse reality’ and values underlie such a 
proposed course of action? This necessitates an analysis of how the EU and EU projects 
are represented by Conservative party leaders in opposition to see whether they try to 
establish an alternative ‘discourse reality’ or ‘regime of truth’ to that of the governing 
Labour party, and one that is powerful enough to convince voters or force the 
government to change their policies. 
 In the British Westminster system, parliament is the “forum of popular debate” as 
well as “the constitutional seat of sovereignty in Britain. It is largely energized by 
political parties” (Kingdom/Fairclough 2014: 459). To follow up on the rise of ‘New 
Right’ thinking in connection to British EU policy, it therefore makes sense to look at the 
discourse influenced and shaped by leading politicians, more precisely by Conservative 
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party leaders. Thus, the focus is on the speeches they gave in the lower chamber during 
the period when the Conservative party constituted Her Majesty’s Official Opposition, 
from 1997-2010. Although the material is publicly accessible online, there is a 
noteworthy research gap here. I prepared a corpus containing all oral interventions 
made by Conservative leaders in parliament during their time in opposition (recorded 
and published in Hansard, the ‘Official Report’ of parliamentary proceedings) and used it 
as a basis for my analysis.1 
 I will apply a mixed-methods approach, using lexical search operations to lead me to 
relevant passages in the corpus. Occurrences are then counted to determine the 
importance of this particular thematic issues before I proceeded to analyse the speeches 
using a method called ‘political discourse analysis’ which was developed by Fairclough 
and Fairclough (2012). They argue that political communication is mainly about 
argumentation. Their reflections result in a four-step analytical process: First, the 
description of the status quo is examined, focusing on word choice and normative 
judgements or evaluations made. In a second step, the presented goals are singled out 
and next, the values underlying these proclaimed goals are collected. The fourth step is 
then to find out how these goals are to be reached according to the speaker 
(Fairclough/Fairclough 2012: 11). 
 Usually, in political discourse, the argumentation will try to ‘sell’ an alternative to 
other politicians and listening voters, especially when the speaker is the leader of the 
biggest opposition party. Unsurprisingly, an alternative way of reaching goals opposing 
those of the governing party is often presented. It is very interesting to see, however, 
that even in cases where the goals are the same, the proposed ways to get there and/or 
the values underlying the line of argumentation are often fundamentally opposed. 
 
Findings 
Overall, Conservative party leaders made oral contributions to a total of 867 separate 
debates while in opposition during the period of Labour governments 1997-2010. The 
word ‘referendum’ (188 instances) and its plural form ‘referendums’ (22 instances) 
were mentioned a total of 210 times. All five Conservative leaders serving in that period, 
namely John Major, William Hague, Ian Duncan Smith, Michael Howard and David 
Cameron, explicitly mentioned referendums in a total of 68 different parliamentary 
debates. 
                                                        
1 The full list of speeches containing the word ‘referendum’ can be found in the appendix. 
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 A first read-through of all the speeches containing these instances led to the result 
that a total of 78 occurrences were not concerned with European policies, but instead 
primarily with the referendums on devolution (21 instances) and the possibility of a 
referendum on proportional representation (24 instances). 
 This left 132 mentions of the word ‘referendum’ in the context of a call for 
nationwide referendums on major European policy projects, which represents about 
60% of all instances. These references to EU referendums were made in a total of 50 
debates. European policies that were cited as necessitating a referendum included the 
(possible introduction of) the euro, the Treaty of Nice, the proposed EU Constitution and 
the Treaty of Nice. An increase in both number and intensity of the calls for a 
referendum on European policy projects can be noticed over time, from the euro with 16 
mentions, to the Constitution treaty with 48 mentions, and the Treaty of Lisbon with 59. 
The constitutional treaties taken together seem to have generated a veritable frenzy of 
calls for a referendum.  
 The calls for a referendum on European policy start surprisingly early: in June 1997, 
only one month after Labour had won their first term under Blair, John Major demanded 
a referendum on the possible introduction of the single currency in the UK: 
A single currency may have rewards at the right time and in the right 
circumstances; but that is not now. […] I set out some time ago the view that I 
believed that it was right to have a referendum, and I have not shifted, nor do I 
expect to shift, from that view. It is a decision unlike any other. (Major 09.06.1997: 
“European Union”) 
His successor William Hague upholds this demand and later adds calls for a referendum 
on the Treaty of Nice in 2000, as illustrated in the example below: 
The Prime Minister emerged with a treaty that takes Europe in the wrong 
direction, and a Conservative Government will not ratify it as it stands. If the 
Government wish to sign up to the three major steps, including the charter of 
rights and the European army, they should first consult the people of this country 
in a referendum. (Hague 11.12.2000: “Nice European Council”) 
Clearly, Hague pitches his opposition to the Nice Treaty here as an election campaign 
promise, and uses the demand for a referendum to illustrate a discourse reality in which 
the contents of the treaty are so far-reaching that the government needs the 
population’s approval to go ahead. 
 With the Treaty of Nice ratified nevertheless and Labour having won a second term, 
Ian Duncan Smith, Hague’s successor as Conservative leader, keeps asking for a 
referendum on the Euro and then also for one on the European Constitution (from May 
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2003 onwards). An example for the continuing relevance of the introduction of the euro 
is the following contribution to Prime Minister Questions in 2003: 
On 10 June the Prime Minister launched a roadshow to sell the single currency to 
the British people. Can he tell us where it has got to? […] The whereabouts of the 
Prime Minister’s roadshow are a mystery even to his Government. The Treasury, 
when asked, says: There are so many roadshow events we can’t begin to list them 
all. The Foreign Office said: The roadshow hasn’t actually begun. Meanwhile, the 
Minister for Europe said: It’s not a literal roadshow, it’s only a figure of speech. 
Given that the roadshow has not even got on the road, will the Prime Minister 
confirm that there will not be a referendum in this Parliament? […] The Prime 
Minister is spinning roadshows, wasting public money and legislating for a 
referendum that he does not have the courage to hold. Why does he not admit 
what everybody else knows – that his dreams, his schemes and his hopes to scrap 
the pound are utterly wrecked? (Duncan Smith 17.09.2003: “Engagements”) 
Here, the expression “to sell the single currency to the British people” is a derogatory 
description of a planned information campaign. It implies that the referendum is not 
prepared in a fair way and objective information is withheld by the government in order 
to persuade voters of something they neither need nor want, like a dodgy salesman. This 
is coupled with accusations that the PM is “wasting public money” to implement “his 
schemes and his hopes to scrap the pound”. This negative framing of losing the national 
currency instead of gaining a new one serves to further malign the proposal. It is a 
curious case of pre-emptively discrediting a possible positive referendum outcome by 
making out the campaign as unfair that betrays the fears that it might turn out to be a 
success for the government holding the referendum. This illustrates that the calls for a 
referendum might be used as an opportunistic strategy of opposing an unwanted policy 
by the Conservative leader. 
 While the euro drops off the agenda soon afterwards, the European Constitution 
continues to be a topic right into the tenure of Michael Howard as leader of the 
Conservative party. Occurrences are quite regular from 2003-2005. The next 
Conservative leader David Cameron is no exception to this pattern and insists on a 
referendum on the EU Constitution and then the Treaty of Lisbon after the ratification 
process of the former has been halted. Cameron claims that the Treaty of Lisbon is really 
the Constitution in disguise and links the two regularly in his speeches, thus establishing 
a discourse reality where the two are one and the same and the same need for a 
referendum therefore applies. Additionally, Cameron later introduces the proposal for a 
‘referendum lock’ (which would later be part of the Con-LibDem coalition agreement) 
ensuring an automatic referendum should any more powers (competences) be 
transferred to the EU level. 
 After the chronological and quantitative aspects as well as the policy issues giving 
rise to the demands for a referendum have been clarified, the paper will address the 
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further research questions of how the calls for a referendum are justified and how the 
context is portrayed in more depth. One especially pertinent example is the following 
speech by Michael Howard on the proposed referendum on the (ultimately failed) EU 
Constitution treaty, which will be analysed in some detail here before the further 
findings are presented: 
The British view is that there should be a modern, flexible, reformed Europe; a 
Europe ready for the challenges of the 21st century; a Europe that is truly free, 
based on co-operation and not coercion; a Europe that transfers powers back from 
Brussels to the nation state – truly a Europe of live and let live. That is what the 
Prime Minister should have been arguing for in Brussels last week. That is what 
the people of this country want. Let us have none of that nonsense about the 
referendum being a question of in or out of Europe; it is about the kind of Europe 
that we want to see. Let me make it clear: I am opposed to this constitution and I 
will play my part in a cross-party campaign, involving people from all parts of the 
country and all walks of life, to say no to this constitution. Britain does not need to 
wait until the last minute to decide; we do not need to wait until other countries 
have spoken. Why cannot Britain do what the Prime Minister says he wants to do 
and give a lead in Europe? Why does he not lead rather than just follow? The fact is 
that the Prime Minister knows that he has no mandate whatever for this 
constitution. There was nothing in his manifesto on the constitution and the British 
people rejected it at the polls only 10 days ago. The fate of this constitution will not 
be decided by the right hon. Gentleman; it will be decided by the British people, so 
why does he not let the British people speak, and let them speak now? (Howard 
21.6.2004: “European Council”) 
Lacking Mandate for European Integration 
 The Conservative leader argues that since a European Constitution was not in the 
Labour manifesto on which the party was elected, the Labour government has “no 
mandate” to take a decision. In a political system that has been characterized by 
parliamentary sovereignty for centuries, this seems quite a remarkable logic for a 
Conservative party; especially so since all party leaders invariably criticized the 
referendums on devolution, proportional representation, regional assemblies and local 
referendums on local matters. 
Resisting Progress in European Integration Equals Strong Leadership  
 Howard expresses a preference for strong leadership and taking a stand in the face 
of resistance or adversity. In his view, insisting on special treatment within the EU can 
be one way of living up to this ideal. This is confirmed by accusations that the 
government is weak and neither providing leadership nor backbone whenever they 
agree to compromise on a European level. Other values summoned up in the 
Conservative line of argumentation include independence, democratic accountability, 
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the adherence to neo-liberal market principles and thus pragmatic and rational 
decision-making, flexibility, and freedom of choice.  
 A further example from the corpus is a contribution by Cameron in 2008, when he 
criticises the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown for a lack of coherence in his EU policy 
stance and a lack of leadership:  
First the Labour Government said they did not want a constitution, then they said 
they would accept a constitution. They said they did not want a referendum, then 
they said they would have a referendum, then they cancelled the referendum and 
brought back the constitution. Now the constitution is half dead on the floor, they 
have not the courage to kill it. Frankly, I have seen more spine and leadership from 
a bunch of jellyfish. Why does the Prime Minister not give some leadership, tell us 
what he thinks, and kill this treaty today? (Cameron 18.6.2008: “Engagements”) 
The EU Member States as Political Opponents and ‘Other’  
The repeated portrayal of other EU member states as self-interested negotiators that do 
not hesitate to “fudge” policy decisions such as the exact terms of the EMU (Hague 
25.3.1998: “Engagements”; 5.5.1998: “Economic and Monetary Union”) implies that they 
are not playing fair but cheating to get what they want. This portrayal of the decision-
making process on the EU level as dishonest and not geared towards British interests is 
used as a justification for calling for a referendum on the single currency. This intensifies 
over time and is later coupled with expressions of distrust in the Labour government 
who cooperate with the allegedly untrustworthy EU leaders instead of prioritising 
British interests. The EU leaders and institutions are thus portrayed as undesirable and 
morally perverse partners as well as a source of metaphorical ‘contagion’, having 
persuaded the Labour government to go along with their “fudged” decisions.  
 The self-conception of the Conservatives, on the other hand, seems to be the 
defender of the will of the people, as well as the only rational and competent safeguard 
for jobs and political powers that would otherwise be transferred to Brussels. They 
claim to represent the “British view” (e.g. Howard 21.6.2004: “European Council”) on 
Europe, bringing up the idea of a national character or at least a unified opinion when it 
comes to policies affecting the relationship with Europe.  
Elite vs. the people  
Taking up another characteristic that is often associated with the debate leading up to 
the in-out referendum in 2016 (as well as the Trump campaign in the US), the populist 
idea that the political elite does not listen and is out of touch can be found as well. 
Moreover, the Conservative leaders portray themselves as not only knowing what “the 
people of this country want” (Howard 21.6.2004: “European Council”) but also as the 
only advocate for them since the government supposedly ignores their wishes.  
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 A poignant example for this accusation is this passage from a speech by Ian Duncan 
Smith, where he insistently calls for a referendum on a EU Constitution treaty to be held 
in the UK and accuses the Prime Minister of elitist seclusion and ignoring the concerns 
and wishes of “the British people”: 
We know that the British people overwhelmingly want to have their say. The right 
hon. Gentleman shakes his head, but it is true. Has the Prime Minister become so 
out of touch, so arrogant, so reliant on a small group of people – oh yes – and so 
reliant on a small group of friends that he will not let the British people have their 
say? (Duncan Smith 14.5.2003: “Engagements”) 
David Cameron’s contribution is also exemplary of this line of argument continuing to be 
used in the Conservative discourse and thus the repeated and sustained attempt to 
establish a discourse reality where the government cannot be trusted to respect the will 
of the people and the political legitimacy of an elected government is questionable: 
On the Lisbon treaty – [ Interruption.] Yes, I read it, actually – Europe’s leaders had 
to make a big decision: do they respect the wishes of the people? The answer was a 
resounding “no”. Just what is it with this Prime Minister and elections? An 
unelected Prime Minister wants to force the Irish people to vote twice because he 
did not like the result the first time, and he refuses to allow the British people to 
vote once because he is afraid that he would not like the result of that, either. Does 
he agree that one of the advantages of an early election here in Britain would be 
that the Lisbon treaty could be put to the people in a referendum, and we could let 
them decide? (Cameron 15.12.2008: “EU Council – Afghanistan, India and 
Pakistan”) 
The ideas expressed here also serve to confirm the strategy of portraying European 
member state leaders as an out-of-touch elite who ignore the wishes and needs of their 
people. The claim that this holds now true for the national government embodied by the 
PM Brown is even more drastically put in the words of Cameron from 2009 when he 
explains “the central question that we believe should lie behind any programme for 
constitutional reform: how do we take power away from the political elite, and give it to 
the man and woman in the street?” (Cameron 10.6.2009: “Constitutional Renewal”).  
The EU as an Obstacle for British Economic Growth 
Further characteristics of the Conservative discourse include the framing of the EU as an 
organisation in need of reform which presents an obstacle to a thriving economy: “Is not 
that an ideal opportunity for Britain to put the case for reform in Europe – the case for a 
Europe that gets out of the way of business, so that wealth and jobs can be created?” 
(Howard 20.12.2004: “European Council”). Clearly, the Conservatives present 
themselves as the party that has the economic situation in the UK at heart while the 
Labour government is portrayed as inactive on that score. The argument is also picked 
up by Cameron, for example, when he gives his verdict on the EU Council in 2010: 
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 2 (2018): 120-34 
 
128 Herrschaft-Iden: Out of the Blue or a Long Time Coming? 
The summit conclusions mention the need for greater economic co-ordination. 
There was some controversy about whether we will end up with any new treaty 
changes. Should not the Prime Minister make three things clear today? First, any 
talk of “economic government” in Europe is wrong. If he agrees, can he explain why 
the phrase remains in the French version of the eurozone statement? Secondly, 
should we not rule out any new treaty change that increases EU control over our 
economic policies? Thirdly, should we not change the law in the UK so that any 
treaty that proposed handing over new areas of power from Britain to Brussels 
would automatically be subject to a referendum, as is the case in Ireland? 
(Cameron 29.03.2010: “European Council”) 
Here, the argument in favour of retaining economic control rather than letting European 
institutions meddle is combined with the call for a general ‘referendum lock’ which 
would prevent any further transfer of competences unto the EU level without a prior 
referendum in the UK.  
Enlargement as the exception from the ‘referendum rule’ 
The only major EU project during the researched period which can be described as an 
exception to the pattern of the Conservative party leader calling for a referendum on a 
major EU project is the 2004 Eastern enlargement, when 10 new members officially 
joined the EU. I found that the enlargement was welcomed and generally referred to in a 
positive way by Conservative party leaders (e.g. Duncan Smith 28.10.2002: “European 
Council”). Criticism in this context was mostly being directed at the costs, as well as 
delays concerning the implementation and not at the project itself. The Eastern 
enlargement of the EU was consequently not subject to any calls for a referendum. 
Against the background of the debate on immigration, one of the most salient issues in 
both the general election campaign in 2015 and in the EU referendum campaign 
(Glencross 2016: 3), this seems surprising indeed.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to trace calls for a referendum on EU policies in parliamentary 
Conservative opposition discourse. I found that calls for a referendum on European 
policy started in 1997 already and increased in intensity and quantity right up until 
2010. They were most frequent where the European Constitution and the Treaty of 
Lisbon were concerned. Interestingly, an in/out referendum was not openly demanded 
by the Conservative leaders in opposition – indeed, they outright denied that their 
opposition to further European integration was equivalent to opposing membership 
altogether. While the EU was heavily criticised by all of them, such a demand could 
possibly not have been squared with the economically rational and pragmatic qualities 
the Conservative party sought to represent. However, Conservative leaders called for 
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referendums on every European integration step from 1997 onwards with the notable 
exception of enlargement – but they did not act on it while in government until 2015. 
 Holding a referendum on European policy is argued to address democratic deficits 
and to help express the will of the people that is supposedly ignored by the government. 
This pitting of the national government or the “political elite” against the people 
occurred throughout the whole research period. However, when it comes to matters the 
Conservative party leaders do not endorse, namely devolution and proportional 
representation, they heavily criticise referendums and accuse the government of 
wasting money on policies nobody wants. It seems, therefore, that forcing a referendum 
on European policy was an opposition strategy of a party that could not expect to block 
unwanted decisions in parliament for thirteen years. A referendum would have handed 
Her Majesty’s Opposition the opportunity to oppose government decisions (Michael 
Howard, as we have seen, announced explicitly that he would campaign against the 
introduction of a European Constitution) where the chances of winning enough support 
in the House of Commons were doubtful. Thus, parliamentary sovereignty was to be 
circumvented in this way. Demands for a referendum on EU integration steps by 
opposition leaders can therefore be called a strategy rooted in political opportunism. 
This conclusion is further supported by the notable exclusion of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargement rounds from the chorus of referendum demands.  
 The findings suggest that the idea of holding a referendum was around for a long 
time and after calling for one for 13 years, the Conservatives would have faced a serious 
credibility issue had they not implemented an EU referendum when they finally came 
into office again without a coalition partner to hide behind in 2015. Without the Liberal 
Democrats, there seems to have been no choice but to follow through and face a 
referendum, and this time on the more fundamental question of remaining or leaving 
the EU altogether. This political strategy implemented by the former opposition leader 
and then Prime Minister David Cameron, who then campaigned to remain inside the 
formerly vilified organisation, backfired spectacularly and cost him his office and the UK 
its place in the European Union. 
 
Outlook: Some Remarks on the Role of Cultural Studies as a Political Project 
The question of what Cultural Studies can contribute to the debate around the rise of a 
‘New Right’ is a very topical one. Having started focusing on the study of the relationship 
between the UK and the EU in 2012, I was surprised that this subject, even though 
touching on the nexus of the political and the cultural, of identity and the representation 
of an ‘other’ and thus on prime Cultural Studies research perspectives, has mostly been 
left to other disciplines such as Political Science and International Relations. Although 
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numerous conferences on the subject were held in the last years, there seemed not to be 
much concern until the Brexit campaign was well under way (or indeed only after the 
referendum result was published). Not even dedicated scholars seemed to believe the 
Brexit could really happen. I would argue that this underestimation of the dynamics at 
work and possible political consequences is dangerous. 
 Of course, a chain of events always seems more clearly visible from an ex-post 
perspective. Still, I believe a warning should have been issued long ago and that 
academics and politicians interested in European cooperation should not have been 
surprised that much by the recent developments, since basically all the ideas have been 
voiced publicly for more than 15 years – and not only by smaller actors which have only 
recently risen to prominence, like UKIP, but by leaders of the party that is presently in 
government. 
 The idea that we can intervene in or at least pick up on discourses appears to have 
been left to newspapers and bloggers. I include myself in the group of people who have 
observed but not become actively engaged (yet). It seems to me that the credentials and 
credibility which academic scholars (still?) possess, at least to a certain degree, should 
have been used in public debate and that the risk of not appearing neutral should have 
been taken earlier, and should certainly be taken now. This also serves to preserve the 
foundations on which many academics working in the field of (British) Cultural Studies 
base professional and personal life plans.  
 Especially in situations where British Studies researchers also teach and are in 
contact with students on a regular basis, the current political situation in the UK should 
be thoroughly addressed. Furthermore, debating skills should be fostered, including the 
ability of our students not only to analyse and critically observe but also to think of and 
discuss possible ways of getting politically active. It is also in their interest as 
prospective exchange students and European citizens to ensure that the world they 
would like to see still exists in a few years. To this end, I suggest we drop the expression 
“of course” from our input to debates held in a seminar situation and show ourselves 
open to “taboo” questions and topics in order not to fall for the danger of taking a certain 
political view for granted or assuming it reflects the mainstream opinion. 
 A further conclusion I draw from my research is that more ways to communicate the 
results of our own observations early (enough) to the public are needed, and 
notifications if signs of major shifts in political dynamics are detected should be issued. 
This necessitates engaging with the following questions: does this violate the doctrine of 
neutrality, of detached observance favoured in (German) academia over taking a 
(political) stand? Does this compromise the quality of research or distort the perspective 
too much? 
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 Organising exchange forums and workshops where advanced students but also the 
public can join is a good way of engaging with others. I am under the impression that 
living in a university ‘bubble’ and not confronting opposing views in the world outside 
academia is not conducive to winning support for ideas we deem important. Trying to 
encourage the voicing of opposing views and allowing them to be discussed instead of 
silently assuming a consensus or common ground is another way of meeting the 
challenge of an emerging ‘New Right’, since it does not leave discursive blanks to be 
filled by them. And lastly, not only contributing to a debate in dedicated journals but also 
in more widely read publications seems important. Open access plays an important role 
here, and I hope this will become a fertile ground for lively interaction. I look forward, 
therefore, to replies or comments to this paper. 
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Appendix 
List of all parliamentary contributions by Conservative party leaders in opposition 
1997-2010 containing the code ‘referendum(s)’: 
 
Speaker_Date_Name of debate_ Hansard Volume Code 
(occurrences) 
referendum EU-related  
Major_1997:05:14_First Day_Vol. 294 referendum (2) no (devolution) 
Major_1997:06:04_Engagements_Vol. 295 referendum (6) no (devolution) 
Major_1997:06:09_European Union_Vol. 295 referendum (2) yes (Euro) 
Hague_1997:06:25_Engagements_Vol. 296 referendum (1) no (devolution) 
Hague_1997:07:23_Engagements_Vol. 298 referendum (1) no (devolution) 
Hague_1998:05:06_Engagements_Vol. 311 referendum (1) no (devolution) 
Hague_1998:05:13_Irish Referendums_Vol. 312 referendum (1) no (devolution) 
Hague_1998:11:04_Engagements_Vol. 318 referendum (4) no (prop. representation) 
Hague_1998:11:24_Debate on the Address_Vol. 321 referendum (6) no (ref. organisation, PR) 
Hague_1999:06:16_Engagements_Vol. 333 referendum (2) yes (Euro) 
Hague_1999:06:23_Engagement_Vol. 333 referendum (1) no (devolution) 
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Hague_1999:11:17_Debate on the Address_Vol. 339 referendum (5) yes (Euro) 
Hague_2000:01:12_Engagements_Vol. 342 referendum (5) no (PR) 
Hague_2000:07:13_Government Annual Report_Vol. 353 referendum (5) yes (Euro) 
Hague_2000:10:25_Engagements_Vol. 355 referendum (2) yes (Euro) 
Hague_2000:12:06_Debate on the Address_Vol. 359 referendum (5) no (devolution, PR) 
Hague_2000:12:11_Nice European Council_Vol. 359 referendum (1) yes (Treaty of Nice) 
Hague_2001:02:07_Engagements_Vol. 362 referendum (1) yes (Euro) 
Hague_2001:06:20_First Day_Vol. 370 referendum (2) yes (Treaty of Nice) 
Duncan Smith_2002:03:20_Engagements_Vol. 382 referendum (2) no (Gibraltar) 
Duncan Smith_2002:05:22_Engagements_Vol. 386 referendum (6) yes (Euro) 
Duncan Smith_2002:06:24_European Council (Seville)_Vol. 
387 
referendum (1) no (Gibraltar) 
Duncan Smith_2002:11:06_Engagements_Vol. 392 referendum (3) no (Gibraltar) 
Duncan Smith_2003:05:14_Engagements_Vol. 405 referendum (4) yes (EU Constitution) 
Duncan Smith_2003:05:21_Engagements_Vol. 405 referendum (4) yes (EU Constitution) 
Duncan Smith_2003:06:18_Engagements_Vol. 407 referendum (5) yes (EU Constitution) 
Duncan Smith_2003:06:23_European Council_Vol. 407 referendum (8) yes (EU Constitution) 
Duncan Smith_2003:09:10_Engagements_Vol. 410 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Duncan Smith_2003:09:17_Engagements_Vol. 410 referendum (2) yes (Euro) 
Duncan Smith_2003:10:29_Engagements_Vol. 412 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Duncan Smith_2003:11:05_Engagements_Vol. 412 referendum (3) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2003:11:26_Debate on the Address_Vol. 415 referendum (8) yes (Euro, EU Constitution) 
Howard_2003:12:03_Engagements_Vol. 415 referendum (1) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2003:12:15_European Council_Vol. 415 referendum (3) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:04:19_Iraq and Middle East Peace Process_Vol. 
420 
referendum (1) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:04:20_Europe_Vol. 420 referendum (12) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:04:21_Engagements_Vol. 420 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:05:19_Engagements_Vol. 421 referendum (1) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:06:21_European Council_Vol. 422 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:11:08_EU Summit_Vol. 426 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:11:10_Engagements_Vol. 426 referendum (1) no (devolution) 
Howard_2004:11:23_Debate on the Address_Vol. 428 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2004:12:20_European Council_Vol. 428 referendum (1) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2005:04:06_Engagements_Vol. 432 referendum (1) no  
Howard_2005:05:17_Debate on the Address_Vol. 434 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2005:06:15_Engagements_Vol. 435 referendum (1) yes (EU Constitution) 
Howard_2005:06:20_European Council_Vol. 435 referendum (1) yes (EU Constitution) 
Cameron_2006:06:19_European Council_Vol. 447 referendum (2) yes (EU Constitution) 
Cameron_2007:06:25_European Council_Vol. 462 referendum (10) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
Cameron_2007:07:03_Constitutional Reform_Vol. 462 referendum (1) yes (power transfer to EU) 
Cameron_2007:07:11_Draft Legislative Programme_Vol. 462 referendum (3) yes (Lisbon Treaty) 
Cameron_2007:07:25_Engagements_Vol. 463 referendum (4) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
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Cameron_2007:10:10_Engagements_Vol. 464 referendum (3) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
Cameron_2007:10:17_Engagements_Vol. 464 referendum (5) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
Cameron_2007:10:22_Intergovernmental Conference 
(Lisbon)_Vol. 465 
referendum (7) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
Cameron_2007:11:06_Debate on the Address_Vol. 467 referendum (5) yes (Lisbon Treaty) 
Cameron_2007:12:17_European Council (Brussels)_Vol. 469 referendum (5) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
Cameron_2008:05:07_Engagements_Vol. 475 referendum (7) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
Cameron_2008:05:14_Draft Legislative Programme_Vol. 475 referendum (1) yes (Lisbon Treaty) 
Cameron_2008:05:14_Engagements_Vol. 475 referendum (3) no (Scottish independence) 
Cameron_2008:06:18_Engagements_Vol. 477 referendum (5) yes (EU Constitution) 
Cameron_2008:06:23_European Council_Vol. 478 referendum (3) yes (Lisbon Treaty, EU 
Constitution) 
Cameron_2008:10:20_European Council_Vol. 481 referendum (1) yes (Lisbon Treaty - Irish vote) 
Cameron_2008:12:15_EU Council: Afghanistan, India and 
Pakistan_Vol.485 
referendum (1) yes (Lisbon Treaty - Irish vote) 
Cameron_2009:06:10_Constitutional Renewal_Vol. 493 referendum (3) yes (Lisbon Treaty) 
Cameron_2009:06:10_Engagements_Vol. 493 referendum (3) yes (EU Constitution) 
Cameron_2009:06:23_European Council_Vol. 494 referendum (2) no  
Cameron_2010:03:29_European Council_Vol. 508 referendum (1) yes (power transfer to EU) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
